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NATO "OUT-OF-AREA": AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND POST-COLD WAR POTENTIAL

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NATO "OUT-OF-AREA": AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
AND POST-COLD WAR POTENTIAL

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines NATO involvement in security interests outside the geographical boundaries of the Alliance; so-called "out-of-area" issues. Out-of-area issues have impacted on NATO since the inception of the Treaty; either as a threat to the security interests of one or more members of the Alliance, a source of diversion of security assets earmarked for NATO, or as an indication of the intentions of communist adversaries. This study traces the history of NATO member nations' attitudes toward the out-of-area question, beginning with the national motivations in joining the Alliance. Specific events, from the Korean War to the Gulf Crisis of 1990, are discussed to identify trends in NATO's approach to out-of-area issues and to provide insights into the national interests of the NATO members. The Warsaw Pact no longer poses the imminent military threat so often cited as rationale for non-involvement in out-of-area issues. This study explores the potential for NATO, in light of the reduced threat in Europe, to expand its horizon to include out-of-area involvement and make a greater contribution to world order and peace.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination among us. Our security is to be seen in a context broader than the protection from war alone". (1)

This quote from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) May 1989 Summit focused on the new challenges facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member nations in the wake of the recent dramatic and historic revolution in Europe. The disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has caused NATO to reassess its missions and priorities in a changing Europe and changing world.

The dramatic chain of events in Europe, characterized as the end of the Cold War, has resulted in speculation as to NATO's role in the future. Certainly the nature and magnitude of the threat have changed. The changes in Central Eastern Europe have virtually eliminated the Soviet Union's capability for command and control over Warsaw Pact nations in any type of military context. East Germany's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in September 1990, followed on 3 October 1990 by unification of Germany, further reduced the imminence of a military threat to NATO's central region. The Soviet Union has announced withdrawal of its forces from what was East Germany and has agreed to a unified Germany's membership in NATO. WTO nations have made overtures of cooperation with NATO and, as in

negotiations for a distribution formula for conventional-arms reductions, continue to demonstrate the absence of Soviet domination. (2)

NATO's historic response to the changes in Eastern Europe is documented in the London Declaration issued on 6 July 1990, which outlines an agenda for the Alliance and Europe. (3) The concept of reaching out to "... our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend(ing) to them the hand of friendship" has set a new course for NATO which focuses on cooperation, non-aggression, and shared military-to-military contacts with the Warsaw Pact member states. (4) As the London Declaration calls for a move away from "forward defense" and modification of the concept of "flexible response", the European and world communities look to a future European union with the promise of peace, economic prosperity, and a "peace dividend" filling the void left by the end of the Cold War. (5)

Although there is reason for great optimism, Europe is not without security risks. Despite actual and programmed reductions in force levels, the Soviet Union is the largest land mass on the European continent and remains a formidable military adversary in Europe. Moscow continues to modernize its conventional ground forces and strategic nuclear arsenal, reducing SS-17 and SS-19, while nearly doubling the number of the more modern SS-24 and increasing deployment of the SS-25 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). (6) Even with the continued Soviet military potential, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as an imminent military threat to the Alliance has

substantial impact on NATO defense planning. As the principal threat which the Alliance was formed to counter, the Warsaw Pact has, in the past, provided rationale for some Alliance members' reinforcement of NATO non-involvement in issues beyond the geographical boundaries drawn by Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty. Reassessment of the threat against NATO member nations in light of the changing European picture must include a fresh review of NATO critical interests. Consideration of issues occurring outside NATO's borders, so called "out-of-area" issues, are an integral element of this threat analysis. In addition to consideration of the Warsaw Pact threat, national views, interests, and capabilities impact on Alliance member nations' response to out-of-area issues.

In examining the out-of-area question, this paper will first review the motivations which led to the NATO Treaty, particularly the different impulses on each side of the Atlantic, followed by an analysis of the Treaty itself as it pertains to out-of-area issues. Previous NATO out-of-area problems will be analyzed to identify trends in both national responses and NATO consideration, as a political entity, of events occurring outside the geographical boundaries of the Alliance. Finally, the analysis will conclude with a review of two out-of-area events threatening Western access to Middle East oil and, ultimately, the economic stability of Europe and the entire West: the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf Crisis, precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These two events provide a prospective of NATO's response to similar out-

of-area problems; both events threatened NATO member nations' access to affordable oil in the Gulf, before and after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a military threat to NATO.

United States Secretary of State James Baker, in a speech in December 1989 said he saw "... resolving regional conflicts as part of NATO's 'second mission' in a world where those conflicts would replace the Cold War struggle". (7) This study reviews the impact of changing world events on NATO's approach to the out-of-area problem and addresses the question of if and how NATO will alter its approach to the out-of-area question. NATO, historically a political force capable of adapting to changing situations, faces a demanding challenge in the decade ahead. In exploring the question of whether NATO will alter its approach to the out-of-area question in light of the changes in Europe, this research effort is intended to be of assistance in meeting that challenge.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE TREATY

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the manner in which NATO member nations have reacted to security issues outside the geographical boundaries of the Alliance has been a source of internal debate and occasional criticism. This is a product, in part, of the American view of NATO and security in Europe as only one element of global security; contrasting with the European concept of NATO's mission, maintaining peace in Europe, as the primary concern, with global issues being matters of important but secondary interest. An understanding of the NATO approach to out-of-area issues requires a review of the motivations of the member nations in forming the Alliance and formulating the Treaty in 1949.

NATO and the subsequent integrated military structure grew from the Brussels Pact of 1948 which formed the Western Union, later revitalized as the Western European Union (WEU). The Brussels Pact, signed in March 1948, established a 50-year alliance among France, Great Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It reflected the signatories' concern over Soviet expansionism, heightened by the failure of the Four Power London Foreign Minister's Conference in December 1947 and the Russian-backed coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. The Brussels Pact had two purposes: first, economic recovery through mutual cooperation; and second, an alliance for a common defense against military aggression, with assurance that

an attack against one would automatically result in assistance from other members. (1)

Any collective defense against Soviet aggression in post-World War II Europe needed American military power to be effective. The importance of American military backing of the Brussels Pact was emphasized by the Canadian Ambassador to Paris in May 1948 when he wrote: "no Frenchman deludes himself that the treaty of Brussels has any value as a weapon of defence against Soviet attack without the military backing of the United States". (2) The United States resisted European efforts to have America join the Western Union as a signatory to the Brussels Pact. This resistance was based on America's historical affinity for isolationism and concern, in the United States State Department, that America would be underwriting a security framework that Europe should rightfully be supporting with its own forces, funding, and materials. (3) American resistance to becoming entangled in a European defense agreement was finally overcome by the following: including additional European nations in what was to become NATO, wording of the NATO Treaty which would allow America to retain options and flexibility in responding to crises threatening the security of Europe, and defining the geographical limits of the Alliance.

Expansion of the original Western Union membership and the anticipated subsequent European unity was important to the United States because of American hesitation to be drawn into another conflict in Europe caused by the clashing of national

interests. (4) At the first meeting of six-power talks on the North Atlantic Treaty in July 1948, United States Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett stated that, in order for the United States to agree to a North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate would need evidence of trends toward unity among the European nations. (5) A second consideration in expanding the number of European nations was their strategic value to the American security and reinforcement of Europe. France and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) agreed with including Portugal in the treaty agreement but had difficulty with expanding the Western Union grouping to include those nations which the United States wanted added for not only political, but strategic, reasons. (6) The original Western Union members were concerned that expansion of the membership would strain the defense capabilities of the Alliance and dilute the amount of military aid they would receive from the United States. (7) The so-called "stepping stone" nations of Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland were eventually invited to join at the insistence of the United States and Canada. (8)

The treaty negotiations were marked by distinctly different perspectives from either side of the Atlantic. The European nations, especially France, recognized their vulnerability to aggression as members of the Western Union and wanted immediate supply of military equipment and long-term assurance of American military assistance in the event of attack, either from the Soviet Union or a resurgent Germany. (9) This was in opposition to American desires not to be

committed to an automatic response. The United States repeatedly made the point, during the treaty negotiations, that it could not accept an automatic commitment to go to war in defense of another country; since only Congress had the authority under the Constitution to declare war. (10) This position was not warmly embraced by France, which argued that all democracies faced the problem of legislative approval for executive agreements. (11) Eventually, however, at the United States' insistence, Article V would contain an "escape clause", providing member nations with some latitude in the manner in which they would come to the aid of another member nation subjected to military aggression. Cautious to avoid being involuntarily involved in European colonial interventions outside the boundaries of the NATO nations, the United States pushed for inclusion of a geographical description of NATO in the treaty. The geographical boundaries of NATO were subsequently included in Article VI. It was in this atmosphere of reluctant agreement to the United States' demands for increased membership, noncommittal wording in the treaty, and a geographical description of NATO boundaries, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949.

The Treaty was formulated to be within the framework of the United Nations Charter. The Preamble to the treaty reaffirms the signatories' "... faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". (12) General Andre' Beaufre of France observed that the North Atlantic Treaty expressed extremely broad and vague principles, leaving

the "... architecture of the Alliance ... to be filled in gradually - in the application of the treaty, in its practice rather than its theory". (13) This best describes the NATO approach to the out-of-area question, which has evolved through forty years of experience; with the 16 signatories to the treaty working and consulting together as members of the Alliance. NATO's dealings with out-of-area issues continue to grow from the members' interpretations of the treaty. These interpretations are based on political motivations rather than a strict legal rendering of the requirements of the treaty. The Articles of the treaty which relate most directly to the question of out-of-area security issues are Articles IV, V, and VI.

Article IV of the Treaty requires "the Parties...consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened".(14) The consultation is mandatory at the request of any one of the members of the Alliance. In addition to threatened "territorial integrity", the Article also includes "political independence" and "security" as equal concerns of the Alliance. The intent of the signatories was to use those somewhat subjective terms to make the Article applicable "... in the event of a threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a threat to the security of their overseas territories".(15)

Article V has been referred to as the "all for one and one

for all" Article. Although not as binding as the romantic pledge of the Three Musketeers, Article V does provide for each member nation to come to the aid of any Alliance member(s) subjected to military attack with "... such action as it deems necessary". (16) This wording is the "escape clause", referred to earlier, which reflects the desires of the United States not to be committed to an automatic response in the defense of European interests. There is no obligation on any signatory of the Treaty to take any action, other than consultation when requested, even in response to aggression within the NATO boundaries.

Article VI draws the geographical boundaries of the NATO Alliance. The geographic area of NATO stipulated by Article VI was initially interpreted by the United States as a limitation on NATO activities and included in the treaty at America's insistence, to avoid being drawn into maintaining European colonial interests. (17) Revisions have been made to Article VI to reflect the accession of Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain; and the elimination of the Algerian departments of France. Although it clearly defines the NATO boundaries, it is the interpretation of Article VI, not its wording, which has provided member nations' rationale for non-involvement in out-of area issues. In fact, there has been something of a reversal in allegiance to a strict interpretation of Article VI; the United States having moved toward a liberal interpretation, encouraging consideration of issues outside the borders, and many European members aligning

with a more conservative position. Nevertheless, Article VI remains pivotal with the out-of-area question.

As General Beaufre noted, the Articles of the Treaty provide the foundation for evolution of policy within the Alliance. A review of NATO actions in response to out-of-area problems provides an understanding of the formation of the "architecture of the Alliance" as it relates to security issues outside the NATO boundaries. Member nations' non-involvement or limited support with Allies in out-of-area issues has historically been grounded on one or more of the following: a hesitation to become involved in an American initiative with the potential to escalate into an East-West confrontation; a concern for diminished security within NATO if forces are diverted outside the defensive perimeter of Europe; an inability to agree upon the severity of a threat, or even if common interests are involved; and finally, diversity of national history or interests relative to certain geographical regions of the world.

The following chapters will review NATO's response to out-of-area issues from the signing of the Treaty to the current crisis in the Gulf. The review will include the following: the Korean conflict, French involvement in Indochina, British-French intervention in the Suez, the Vietnam War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf Crisis resulting from Iraq invading Kuwait in August 1990. Evaluation of NATO actions during these crises will help in developing an understanding of the impulses

within the Alliance concerning the out-of-area concept.

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13. Ireland, p. 114.
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17. "Quotes from the Secretary General", NATO Press Service, 25 September 1986.

CHAPTER THREE

KOREA TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 1949-1973

Out-of-area issues have impacted on NATO since the inception of the Treaty, either as a threat to the security interests of one or more members of the Alliance, a source of diversion of security assets earmarked for NATO, or as an indication of the intentions of communist adversaries. The following pages will review situations from 1949 to 1973 which have occurred outside the geographical boundaries of NATO and have had a significant and lasting impact on NATO member nations' approach to out-of-area issues. The review will demonstrate how the United States and its European Allies have essentially traded positions on the question of out-of-area involvement. Understanding the evolution of this transition of attitudes will be helpful in a later evaluation of NATO's response to crises in the Middle East and, ultimately, in formulating an assessment of what NATO can and should do in this decade to protect vital interests outside its geographical boundaries.

The NATO Treaty was less than one year in existence when an event occurred in the Far East which would have a profound impact on the Alliance. On 25 June 1950, North Korean Communist divisions crossed the 38th parallel in a surprise attack on South Korea. The United States responded by requesting the United Nations order a cease fire. The United Nations complied; but the order was ignored. On 27 June, the United States

committed air and naval forces to assist in the defense of South Korea, followed by a commitment of ground forces on 1 July.

The potential for communist aggression in Europe, similar to that witnessed in Korea, and the United States' resolve in confronting that aggression, was not lost on the members of the Alliance. On 15 September 1950, the North Atlantic Council met in New York to focus on one problem: "... how to defend the NATO area from an aggression similar to that which had taken place in the Far East". (1) The result was a decision to defend against any Soviet aggression as far east as possible. This "forward defense" strategy required a military force of a size and capability far exceeding NATO's forces at the time. The Council determined that member nations should take immediate action to increase the size of their military forces to deter communist aggression and these forces would be "... an integrated force under a centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe". (2) The United States deployed four Army divisions to Europe, as part of the NATO military restructuring, and insisted upon expanding membership of the Alliance to include Turkey and Greece, for security on the southern flank. The "militarization" of NATO was completed with plans for rearmament of West Germany and creation of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, (SHAPE) under the command of General Eisenhower. As a result of the Korean War, NATO's defense expenditures were doubled in 1950-1951 and increased an

additional 40% the following year. (3)

The war in Korea not only demonstrated to Alliance members the United States' resolve in confronting communism but also caused concern over the United States' tendencies to pursue "impatient and provocative" policies in its dealings with the Soviet Union and China. (4) This concern resulted, in part, from observations of the difficulties the United States had in controlling its commander in the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur pursued policies which resulted in a war with China and, had he not been reined in by President Truman, could have led to a war with the Soviet Union. (5) The main concern highlighted by the Korean War was, however, the vulnerability of Central Europe, particularly a divided Germany, to communist aggression. Therefore, the United States' initiative received support within the Alliance.

During the same time period, France was involved in an armed conflict outside the NATO boundaries which also received encouragement, if not assistance, from the Alliance. In March 1945, the last of the organized French units in Indochina had been destroyed by the Japanese and Japan had declared Indochina "independent" of French influence. (7) This marked the end of close to 60 years of French administration of French Indochina or Vietnam. France's military attempts to restore her colonial relationship with Vietnam began when Marshal Leclerc's armored forces landed in South Vietnam in October 1945 and ended on 21 July 1954, in the wake of France's tragic defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. (8)

Within the Alliance, the United States assisted France financially in the Indochina War, reaching a total of 2.6 billion dollars between 1950 and 1954. (9) In December 1952, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) commented on the French involvement in Indochina. The Council expressed "... its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces" and acknowledged "...that the resistance of the free nations in South East Asia as in Korea is in the fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community ... and deserves continuing support from the NATO governments". (10) While the Alliance members heard a briefing from France on the Indochina War at the December 1952 NAC meeting, there was no consultation among the Allies. An attendee described the meeting as "singularly unproductive" and observed that the Alliance "... may, in fact, be getting close to the situation in NATO where discussions are avoided in order to escape responsibility" - adopting a policy of avoiding consultation in order to escape commitments. (11) The outcome was an endorsement of France's actions and objectives, but no movement toward NATO involvement or assistance.

While French involvement in Indochina was recognized by NATO as important in the global struggle against communist expansionism and, therefore, important to the goals of the Alliance, the United States expressed concern over the impact of the conflict on security in Europe. A Pentagon report in 1950 highlighted the extensive French casualties from the Indochina War and expressed concern over the impact attrition

of French officers would have on NATO's security posture. The report stated that French casualties in Indochina during the period 1945-1950 "... exceeded fifty thousand and officers are being lost ... faster than the rate they are being graduated from officer schools in France". (12) This concern by one or more member nations, over diversion or depletion of military capabilities due to out-of-area interventions, has been a continuing source of tension throughout the history of the Alliance, even when the objectives of the intervention are fully supported by the NATO members. In 1955 the NAC issued a Council Resolution requiring NATO nations to notify the Council and the NATO Military Authorities of a final national decision to divert forces, either assigned in NATO or earmarked for NATO, to an emergency outside NATO's geographical boundaries. (13)

Members of the Alliance would become involved in hostilities outside the NATO area the following year, which would demonstrate a lack of consensus between Allies and result in a serious intra-ally confrontation involving France, Great Britain and the United States. On 6 July 1956, Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal to finance construction of the Aswan High Dam. The Suez Canal held strategic and economic significance for the West, particularly for France and Great Britain which maintained colonial interests in the region. Both France and Great Britain were dependent upon an open Suez Canal to guarantee uninterrupted access to their supply of oil. (14) In

addition, strategically, in order for the Soviet ships to reach the ocean from their Black Sea terminals, they had to pass through the Turkish straits and then either through the Suez Canal or through the NATO-dominated Mediterranean and Strait of Gibraltar.

On 2 August, Great Britain, France, and the United States signed a tripartite declaration stating that the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt "... menaced the security of the canal".(15) However, the United States was strongly opposed to military intervention, while both France and Great Britain saw the crisis as an excellent opportunity to reestablish fading colonial dominance in the area. Although they did not ask for the United States to join in an expeditionary force, Great Britain looked to the United States to prevent Soviet intervention. (16) France and Great Britain saw the United States and, specifically, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as undermining their efforts to intimidate Colonel Nasser into submission. France and Great Britain entered into a conspiratorial plan with Israel, involving a 29 October attack by Israel on Egypt with French-British intervention to follow in a "peace keeping" effort. On 5 November, France and Great Britain landed expeditionary forces at Port Said in accordance with the scenario worked out with Israel. This military intervention, which failed miserably, was conducted not only without notifying the United States beforehand, but actually as part of a planned deception to preclude American action to prevent their last major attempt at

enforcing an evaporating colonial domination in the area. (17)

The Suez Canal crisis caused both economic and political awakenings in NATO. Western Europe experienced the economic shock of restricted access to oil supplies as a result of closure of the Suez Canal. (18) Politically, America, disassociating itself from its most powerful NATO allies, opposing their intervention in the Suez, and ultimately forcing their withdrawal from the Canal area, demonstrated the United States' strong opposition to the military out-of-area intervention; a position which would see a complete reversal in the 17 years that followed.

The rift between France, Great Britain, and the United States over the Suez Crisis caused recognition within NATO that the objectives of the Alliance could best be served by improved unity among the Allies. In May 1956, the NAC appointed three Ministers: Lester B. Pearson of Canada, Geatano Martino of Italy, and Halvard Lange of Norway; to recommend ways in which the Council could better perform its task as a forum for consultation (19). The following excerpt from the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, published in December 1956, demonstrates the concern for unity and recognition of the impact out-of-area issues have on the Alliance:

"NATO should not forget that the influence and interest of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic

Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere and for the maintenance of international peace and security and for solutions that now divide the world." (20)

NATO solidarity in dealing with out-of-area issues would again be put to the test in South East Asia, as it had been during the Korean War. However, this time the concerns of the Alliance members would not center as much on communist expansionism as on a concern over the wisdom of the United States' foreign policy architects and diversion of forces outside NATO . (21)

The United States' conservative approach to military intervention had continued through the 1950's under the leadership of President Eisenhower, who had experienced the Korean War and Suez Crisis. The United States did, however, provide military advisors to Vietnam, following the French disengagement in 1954. By 1961 the American military mission in Vietnam totaled approximately 700, in addition to a small British advisory mission. (22) Direct military involvement under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson resulted in a dramatic increase to 525,000 American combat and support forces in

Vietnam by 1967. (23)

Although the United States viewed Korea and Vietnam as basically the same threat of communist expansionism, applying the "domino theory", its European allies perceived these two out-of-area conflicts quite differently. (24) While the Korean War was acknowledged by the Alliance as being "...in the fullest harmony with the aims and ideals ..." of NATO, Vietnam was mentioned in NAC communiques issued in 1965 and 1967, respectively, only as one of the "...areas of tension or conflict..." that "... may impair (the North Atlantic Treaty area) security either directly or by affecting the global balance". (25)

There was no substantive consultation within NATO on Vietnam. The lack of consultation was a result, at least in part, of an historical aversion, particularly by the more powerful Allies, to open national policies to discussion within the Alliance. This trepidation is due to recognition of the potential for the Ally to find itself isolated with an unpopular position. (26) Different perceptions within the Alliance, of the importance of an out-of-area problem, the magnitude of the threat it presents to NATO, and the correct response to the problem, are questions at the core of the out-of-area issue.

This diversity in views was recognized in 1967 in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, known as the Harmel Report, which states that "As sovereign states, the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective

decision". (27) The Harmel Report was to be " ... a broad analysis of international developments ... to determine the influence of such developments on the Alliance and to identify tasks which lie before it ...". (28) The following excerpt from the Report reflects the ad hoc approach to out-of-area problems recommended by the committee and approved by the NAC:

" The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies, or such of them as wish to do so, will continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand" (29)

A comparison of NATO members' reactions to the American involvement in the Korean War, French involvement in Indochina, and American involvement in Vietnam exemplifies the diversity of perceptions within the Alliance. NATO Allies were concerned over the threat of an East-West confrontation during the Korean War and the diversion of resources to Southeast Asia during the French military actions in Indochina. However, the purposes of

the American and French efforts in Korea and Indochina, respectively, were lauded in official communiques, providing moral, if not material, support. The American prosecution of the Vietnam War, on the other hand, was openly criticised by the European Allies. European members of the Alliance were not reassured by the United States' resolve to fight communist expansionism but, rather, were appalled by what was viewed as America's poor judgement and were concerned over the significant drain of the Vietnam War on American resources and energies away from the European Theater. (30) At the height of the Vietnam War, the United States had diverted 300 billion dollars to the war while the Soviet Union had, at the same time, increased defense spending by five percent. (31)

Domestic backlash in the United States over the Vietnam War also had a significant impact on Alliance members' views of out-of-area involvement. One reaction of the United States Congress in 1971, to the tremendous cost of Vietnam, was to question the expense of the American commitment to NATO. Congressional efforts, in the form of the Mansfield Resolutions, were directed at troop withdrawals from Europe to reduce the 1.5 billion dollars annual cost of stationing one-half million American forces in Europe. (32) As the United States withdrew from South East Asia, America's failure in Vietnam was constantly in the media, reminding the European Allies of the negative aspects of being a world policeman. (33)

While the United States was extracting itself from the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union, in direct contradiction to

assurances Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev gave the United States in 1972 to abide by rules of "peaceful coexistence", was preparing an attempt to gain unprecedented influence in the Middle East. On 6 October 1973, the Yom Kippur War was initiated with the attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria, culminating an investment by the Soviet Union of billions of dollars and thousands of its experts in organizing, training, and equipping the Arab armies. Former United States Assistant Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow theorized that, by capitalizing on Arab hostilities toward Israel, Moscow believed that an Arab victory over Israel would result in the Arab nations being totally dependent on the Soviet Union for their security. According to Rostow, the Arab attack on Israel "... was the most serious and fundamental Soviet thrust of the entire postwar period against the Atlantic Alliance - a bold and carefully prepared attempt to neutralize Europe, dismantle NATO, and drive the United States out of the Mediteranean and Europe itself". (34)

This view was not shared by America's European Allies. Each European country's economic interests and special relations with the individual Arab nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf provided an entirely different perspective of the war from that of America. The United States viewed the crisis as an East-West confrontation with the Soviet Union and implemented a worldwide alert on 25 October (DefCon 3) without consulting with its Allies. The European members were angered over not being consulted, particularly since military bases in

their territories were placed on alert which impacted directly and dramatically on their security. (35) European perception of the crisis was influenced by its historical ties with, and energy-dependence on, the Arab states. (36) In November 1973, the European Economic Community (EEC), the majority of which are NATO member nations, issued a communique that endorsed the Arab interpretation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967. The effect was a rejection of the United States' position in the Middle East and endorsement of the Arab invasion of Israel. (37) While the United States' position has been to refrain from recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) until it recognizes Israel's right to exist, the EEC communique stated that "... account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians". (38) Consequently, as America rushed aid to Israel, most of the members of the Alliance refused to allow the United States to use their territories or air space. (39) The reaction in America was "... that the United States found itself on the brink of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and in this circumstance our European allies deserted us". (40)

The Arab-Israel War not only caused open disagreement among the Allies on the proper approach in the Middle East crisis, but also introduced the use of the "oil weapon". In 1973, 62% of the European Community member states' total energy needs were supplied through the imports of petroleum. Germany (56%), Italy (63%), the United Kingdom (68%), and France (63%) imported the majority of their crude oil from the Persian Gulf.

(41) Arab manipulation of world oil prices began in December 1973, when the six Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced the doubling of the cost of crude oil. The ensuing continued escalation of oil prices, which were quadrupled by 1975, caused a trade imbalance in Western Europe which led to steadily increasing inflation and unemployment. (42) The oil crisis is credited with convincing Europe to take a more pro-Arab position on the Palestinian question, in opposition to the United States, by reenforcing the criticality of Middle East oil to European economic well-being. (43)

The diverse perspectives of the NATO member nations, which have characterized virtually every out-of-area issue in the history of the Alliance, are governed by national interests which, in turn, impact on threat assessments and views of appropriate courses of action. As this review has shown and as stated in the Harmel Report, there is no obligation for any member nation to subordinate its national interests to a collective decision of the Alliance. Two major factors characterized NATO's approach to out-of-area issues in the twenty-four year period from the founding of the Alliance to the Arab-Israeli War: disagreement among the Allies and a reversal of positions on the part of the United States and Europe.

The cord of consistency, which runs through each out-of-area problem encountered by NATO from its inception through the Yom Kippur War, has been the inability of the member nations to

reach consensus on the seriousness or imminence of the threat and the appropriate actions to be taken. However, in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, there was no disagreement among the Alliance members on the economic and strategic importance of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Given this common ground and with this review as a foundation, the following chapter will analyze NATO member nations' responses to the first major crisis in the Middle East following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, members of the Alliance had a renewed awareness of the inherent dangers in the Middle East. In addition to the diverse national interests of NATO members in addressing the security implications in the Middle East, the emergence of the "oil weapon" added to the complexity of NATO's inability to agree upon an approach to this out-of-area problem. On 17 October 1973, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya agreed to reduce oil production by five percent a month until Israel withdrew from the territories taken in 1967. Within three weeks, the monthly production was cut further to twenty-five percent and all oil shipments to the Netherlands and the United States were stopped. (1) The oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands, although easily circumvented, accentuated the lack of unity in NATO. Oil prices were eventually quadrupled, from two-three dollars a barrel before the war to twelve dollars a barrel in January 1974. Even though, considering the rate of inflation, the real price of oil declined by four percent from 1975 to 1979, the lesson of the criticality of Middle East oil to western economic prosperity was clear. (2) This was especially true for the European countries who were more dependent on the Persian Gulf oil than the United States and thus faced greater economic peril. The economic threat was not the only concern, however.

The level of concern was heightened by the instability in Iran, where the United States Embassy and 53 hostages were seized in Tehran on 4 November 1979 by Islamic revolutionaries. Perhaps more significant than the oil weapon and instability in the Middle East was the fact that, because European allies refused to support American efforts during the Arab-Israeli War, the United States believed it could not depend on European support in confronting the Soviet Union in the Middle East. (3)

It was in 1979, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would provide another test, in the Middle East, of NATO member nations' ability to display solidarity in responding to events outside its borders. Political analysts differ on the motivation for the invasion. One school of thought saw the purpose of the military intervention as a means of improving Soviet political influence by removing Afghanistan President Amin, whose relationship with the Kremlin had been steadily declining since he took power in the wake of the 1978 coup. A second theory postulated that the Soviet Union was making its way toward the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to gain control of oil supplies and secure a warmwater port. Also, air force facilities in Afghanistan provided Soviet tactical air assets excellent access to the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean. Finally, there were those who believed that Moscow was attempting to protect the predominantly Moslem southern republics of the Soviet Union from the spread of uprisings spurred by Islamic fundamentalists in Iran. (4) Regardless of the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, its invasion of

Afghanistan created serious security concerns for the Alliance.

The response of the Alliance to the Soviet invasion was to be in two phases: immediate diplomatic measures; followed by military measures, to counter the strategic advantage gained by the Soviet Union through occupation of Afghanistan. (5) The NAC met in Brussels within two weeks of the invasion to discuss diplomatic measures to be taken in response to the Soviet invasion. Possible measures included the initiation of economic and trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, the recall of diplomats from Moscow and Kabul, and the boycott of the upcoming Olympic Games in Moscow. The results were less than dynamic. The NAC issued a statement that "Each member state will take appropriate individual measures and steps" in response to the Soviet aggression. (6)

NATO's inability to reach agreement on sanctions against the Soviet Union reflected not only disagreement between the United States and its European Allies, but also a lack of consensus within Europe. The United States' request for a consensus on diplomatic measures to be taken was based on the conviction that a unified NATO position would have the greatest impact on the Soviet Union. While Great Britain supported the United States' position, Germany was not enthusiastic. Germany received large imports of natural gas from the East and was doing five billion dollars worth of business a year with the Soviet block. Not wanting to jeopardize its economic relationships with the East, Germany wanted the sanctions question deliberated in the United Nations, not NATO. (7)

France did not hesitate in voicing its opposition to any retaliatory diplomatic measures against the Soviet Union. France not only refused to support any sanctions, but refused to join discussions within NATO directed at reaching a consensus for a course of action. Further distancing itself from a NATO response to the Soviet aggression, France sent a delegation to Moscow to discuss the Afghanistan issue. French President Giscard d'Estang, stressing the importance of a European approach to the crisis and typifying the Europeans' resentment of what was perceived as American attempts to dominate NATO policy outside the Alliance's boundaries, stated that "...two major voices have been heard... the United States and the Soviet Union... It is important to show that European powers have special relationships...". (8) Sanctions eventually imposed by individual nations, not NATO as a political entity, against the Soviet Union were virtually insignificant and implemented only after considerable delay. (9)

The Alliance's consideration of appropriate military measures to be pursued did not produce any greater degree of solidarity than in the diplomatic arena. The United States reacted to the invasion quickly with the Carter Doctrine, announced by President Carter in his 23 January 1980 State of the Union address in which he stated that "Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". (10) Prior to the

Soviet invasion, the United States was formulating plans for a military capability to respond to protect American interests in the Middle East. The Soviet aggression into Afghanistan and subsequent implementation of the Carter Doctrine hastened the establishment of this capability in the form of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).

The European members of the Alliance, on the other hand, were not in favor of a military response to troubles in the Middle East. The United States' announcement of the Carter Doctrine fell on deaf ears in Western Europe. Clearly not interested in sharing the American pledge to defend vital interests in the Middle East, the European Allies had no reaction to either President Carter's January pronouncement or to a formal request from America for NATO Allies to share some of the military and financial burden of deploying troops to the Persian Gulf. (11) This formal request was made in April 1980 when United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Robert Komer, presented America's RDJTF concept to NATO. The United States requested its European Allies to provide support on three tiers: to replace American forces diverted from Europe to the Middle East, to assist with transportation assets to deploy United States forces, and to use their naval and air force surveillance assets to assist in gathering intelligence in the region. (12)

European lack of support for the American approach to the Middle East resulted from several factors. Many of the European nations viewed the United States' actions as an overreaction,

resorting to military options before all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. The European Allies favored what they envisaged as a more balanced and comprehensive approach; believing they should cooperate with all countries in the region on equal terms and include in the negotiations anyone who could assist in a solution, including the Soviet Union and the PLO. (13) In addition, President Carters' relations with Europe at the time were extremely poor. The RDJTF presentation by Under Secretary Komer was presented to the NATO Allies as a fait accompli; an assumption by the United States that its European Allies were automatically, and without prior consultation, implicated in American interests outside the Treaty area. The European Allies saw Carter as willing to sacrifice European security to come to terms with the Soviet Union; recalling his move to incorporate Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations with Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) without including America's NATO Allies in consultations. (14) The Alliance members' mistrust of President Carter's intentions toward the security of Europe was exacerbated by a lack of confidence in his acumen and abilities in foreign relations. This concern was reenforced when President Carter admitted that he was "shocked" by the Soviet move into Afghanistan. (15)

As indicated by the performance of the NATO members in response to the Afghanistan invasion, events which clearly threatened the security of the Alliance did not precipitate an agreed-upon, timely response, either political or military, from the members of the Alliance. The Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan not only displayed Moscow's willingness to use military force to obtain objectives, but had the potential of providing the Soviet Union the opportunity to control European access to Middle East oil; both of which represented a threat to the vital interests of the NATO Alliance. NATO, however, did not even initiate consultations on the invasion of Afghanistan until April, four months following the invasion and after all the members had taken whatever actions they thought appropriate. (16)

In May, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) did acknowledge the importance of the Middle East to NATO's security and issued the following final communique addressing the out-of-area question:

"5. Ministers agreed that stability of regions outside NATO boundaries, particularly in the South West Asia area and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries. The altered strategic situation in South West Asia warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of Allied cohesion as a response to new challenges...

6. It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South West Asia... The burden,

particularly as far as defense measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States, which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all Allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary ... in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities in South West Asia... Allied capabilities to deter aggression on and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened." (17)

Despite the disagreement on the severity of the threat to NATO and inability to agree upon appropriate actions, the NATO response to the Soviet invasion did produce a major change in the Alliance's reaction to the out-of-area question. Although the above quoted position of the DPC was very tentative, it did identify the need for European Allies to assume a greater military responsibility in the NATO area if the United States NATO forces were diverted to the Middle East. This concept of "compensating" the United States' efforts by identifying "force goals" to replace American units occupied with out-of-area problems, represented a major change in NATO's approach to security issues outside the boundaries of the Alliance. (18)

While the DPC, whose charter it is to address military

requirements, issued a communique in May identifying the principle of compensation, the NAC communique one month later was less specific. The NAC, mandated to address political, as opposed to military issues, issued a communique in June addressing South West Asia, stating that the security of South West Asia "... is primarily the concern of the countries there..." but the "... Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reasons of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region". (19) The NAC also called for a "... resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the Allies". (20) To this end, the European Allies had, by 1982, on an ad hoc basis outside the realm of official NATO consultations or action, agreed to provide up to 600 naval ships and 50 aircraft to assist United States troop deployments across the Atlantic. There was also general agreement among the Allies in Europe to increase reserve force levels in support of the concept of compensation. (21) France and Great Britain also began to improve their force projection capabilities and, by the close of the decade, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain would have developed some degree of rapid force deployment.

Up to this point in the Alliance's evolution of thought in addressing out-of-area issues, the Soviet Union's stated political position, military capabilities and intentions were the dominant theme central to the Allies' considerations of the magnitude of the threat and possible courses of action. The

Alliance's concern over the impact of out-of-area events on the territorial security of NATO culminated in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the European Allies assuming greater military responsibility and adopting the concept of compensating for troop diversions outside NATO.

The following chapter will review the Iran-Iraq War, which was fought, with varying degrees of intensity, from 1980 to 1988 and caused the out-of-area issue to once again surface within NATO. This war, however, marked a drift in the principle concerns of NATO relative to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The threat of Western economic instability due to a potential loss of access to Middle East oil was to attain a significance equal to, and, before the close of the decade, greater than, the threat of Soviet expansionism and an East-West confrontation.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

While the debate on a unified response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was continuing in NATO, other events occurred in the Middle East which would cause considerable discussion within NATO regarding out-of-area security issues. The stability in the Middle East, from a Western perspective, had deteriorated by the close of the 1970's. Competition between Iran and Iraq for dominance in the region would result in an eight-year war which would threaten Western access to Middle East oil and focus world attention on the Persian Gulf.

Following an increasing number of demonstrations, protests, strikes, and acts of terrorism, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahvali, the Shah of Iran, was forced to leave the country on 13 January 1979. His government was replaced by the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini. The Ayatollah Khomeini had been exiled to Iraq by the Shah of Iran in 1963. From 1963 to 1978, Khomeini conducted a propaganda campaign against the Shah from the Islamic (Shia) city of Nejaf, Iraq. In October 1978, he was forced to move to Paris where he continued his anti-Shah propaganda with the tacit approval of the French Government. (1) On 13 January 1979, Khomeini returned triumphantly to Iran with an intense sense of rivalry with Iraq for dominance in the region and an equally intense hatred for the West, the United States in particular. The purge of the armed forces that followed,

coupled by desertion of the Shah's conscripts, resulted in a severely depleted Iranian military; declining from a strength of 400,000 under the Shah to about 240,000. (2) On 4 November 1979, the American Embassy in Teheran was seized by Iranian "students" and the Embassy staff taken hostage.

While the Ayatollah Khomeini was presiding over a fragmented and divided Iran, changes were also occurring in Iraq. On 16 July 1979, Iraqi Foreign Minister Saddam Hussein Takriti forced President Ahmed Hassan Bakr from power and became President of Iraq. Shia leaders in Iraq were being encouraged by Khomeini to oust Hussein and turn Iraq into a Shia theocracy. In retaliation, Hussein decreed that support of Khomeini was an offense punishable by death. He brought 68 Iraqi political and military leaders to trial for sympathizing with Khomeini, executing 21 of them. (3)

The dispute between Hussein's Iraq and Khomeini's Iran over frontier border territory in the Shatt al-Arab area and, more significantly, competition for supremacy in the Persian Gulf region, culminated in a 22 September 1980 invasion of Iran by four Iraqi divisions. This was the first battle of an Iran-Iraq War that would last eight years and cause disagreement once again within NATO on the proper response to an out-of-area crisis. Within the Alliance, security concerns for the continued flow of Middle East oil to customers outside of the Persian Gulf joined fears that the conflict would escalate into an East-West confrontation. While the security objectives were essentially common to the member nations, agreement on the

proper approach to achieve those objectives was another matter.

One of the immediate impacts the war had on the West was to place oil tankers shipping oil out of the Persian Gulf in peril. With over sixty percent of the world's oil coming from the Gulf region, the United States was concerned that a spread of the conflict in the area could result in a severe global petroleum shortage. President Carter stated that, while the West could cope with a shortfall in Iranian and Iraqi oil shipments, it was "imperative that there be no infringement" of the other Gulf nations' abilities to transport oil outside the region. (4) After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States pledged to maintain free access to Middle East oil by ensuring the Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean would remain open. (5)

The United States requested its NATO Allies join in forming a joint naval task force to maintain security for oil tankers moving through the Strait of Hormuz. The concept was not well received by the NATO Alliance. Under the auspices of NATO, the European Allies remained hesitant to follow the United States' lead in actions outside the NATO area, being sensitive to domestic perceptions that, as members of the Alliance, they were being coerced into doing the United States' bidding in support of American global strategy. Knowing the Soviet Union had voiced its opposition to a joint European naval force, Great Britain, France, and Italy were concerned over the potential for an East-West confrontation in the Persian Gulf. (6) The European Allies also saw such a move as

too firm a commitment and felt that a joint naval force would resemble a NATO task force, giving the impression that NATO was quietly expanding its area of responsibility. (7)

Although Great Britain and France did not sign up to the joint naval task force concept, both nations realized the severity of the threat to their economic stability and eventually dispatched additional warships to the Persian-Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to work with American naval ships already in the area. Italy also assisted by assuming some of the United States Sixth Fleet responsibilities in the Mediterranean, compensating for the diversion of two United States carrier task forces from that area to the Gulf region. By the end of October 1980 there were over sixty British, French, Australian, and American naval ships in or near the Persian Gulf. (8) In the end it was bilateral ad hoc coordination and the application of national positions, neither NATO consultations nor a NATO position, which produced European augmentation of American efforts to provide security for oil shipments in the Persian Gulf.

Having summarily dismissed the option of participating in a military response to protect oil shipments, the Alliance was equally unable to agree on diplomatic measures which would have the potential of defusing the war. The special relationships and trade agreements the NATO Allies exercised with both Iran and Iraq precluded achieving solidarity in a NATO position within the consultative framework of the Alliance. A review of the individual national positions of the Allies reveals the

complexity of the problem.

The French Government, despite having previously provided refuge for Khomeini, openly sided with Iraq; adding the caveat that France had friends but no enemies in the region. The French position was based on France's determination that an Iranian victory would further degrade Middle East stability by creating the potential for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region. (9) Iraq was also a lucrative customer for France, accounting for forty percent of the total French arms exports during 1980-1982, at a price of forty billion francs. (10) Great Britain, on the other hand, adopted a position of neutrality and rejected Iraqi requests for arms and ammunition and stated it would not honor previous guarantees to deliver military equipment to Iran. (11) In March 1981 it was reported that the Italian Government had authorized the export to Iraq of warships valued at 829 million Italian lira. (12) The Turkish government, which shares frontier borders with both Iran and Iraq, maintained neutrality and announced on 2 October 1980 that it had barred the passage of all arms, military equipment and personnel across its territory to either Iran or Iraq "in the interest of not contributing to the continuation of the conflict". (13) The United States adopted a neutral posture, announcing on 25 September 1980 the suspension of a shipment of military equipment to Iraq. On the same day, United States Secretary of State Edmund Muskie met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the result of which was an agreement between the two superpowers to preserve neutrality in the

conflict. (14) The United States did, however, dispatch four Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) reconnaissance aircraft, two KC-135 in-flight refueling aircraft, and forty military personnel to Saudi Arabia in response to a request from the Saudi Government for United States military assistance against possible Iranian attack. (15)

The role of NATO during this period was to support a September 1980 United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities in the region. Avoiding involvement as a political entity in the crisis, NATO expressed concern over the events in the Middle East and provided a forum for consultation and information exchange concerning the crisis, but continued to limit its consideration of diplomatic and military measures to concerns regarding security issues within the geographic boundaries of the Alliance. The divergent national views, interests, political positions and actions taken by the member nations of the Alliance in the first years of the Iran-Iraq War demonstrate the difficulty involved in NATO attempting to formulate a position or course of action in response to a crisis outside its borders.

The Iran-Iraq War can be differentiated from previous out-of-area issues in that the Soviet Union played a virtually insignificant role in the scenario, having pledged neutrality in the early stages of the conflict. While there was concern within the Alliance of escalation to an East-West confrontation with the naval operation to secure oil shipments, the central issue was security for transporting Middle East oil to Western

consumers, not displaying resolve in the face of spreading communist hegemony as it had been in previous crises. The war highlighted the extent to which the West's industrial prosperity and independence hinges on access to the strategic oil reserves in the Middle East. The war also demonstrated the inability or unwillingness of NATO member nations, even when faced with a common threat to their vital economic interests, to reach a consensus on courses of action, either diplomatic or military.

Although, as a political entity, NATO did not take any action in response to the Iran-Iraq War other than supporting the United Nations call for a cease fire, it did address the criticality of out-of-area issues to the security interests of the Alliance. The Final Communique from the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in May 1982 provided the following reference to out-of-area issues:

"8. Ministers stressed their common interest in the security, stability and sovereign independence of the countries outside the NATO area. At the same time military aggression in areas outside NATO has the potential to threaten the vital interests of members of the Alliance... (Ministers) reaffirmed that consultations on any out-of-area deployment forces, such as envisaged by the United States Rapid Deployment Force, are intended to identify common objectives, taking full account of the political

situation in the area concerned and of the effect on Alliance security and defence capability as well as the national interests of member countries.

Recognizing that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, Ministers agreed that the effect of such deployment on Alliance security and defence capabilities should be examined collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies... (Ministers) agreed that members of the Alliance may be required to facilitate out-of-area deployments in support of the vital interests of all".

(16)

By 1982 it was clear that the Iran-Iraq War was not going to be decided quickly, but would be a war of attrition and a test of both adversaries' military and economic endurance. Iraq, by this time, was on the defensive and the expense of the war was draining Iraqi manpower and financial reserves. (17) In a move to turn the tide of the conflict by jeopardizing Iran's oil revenues, Iraq declared an exclusion zone in the northern area of the Persian Gulf which included Iran's lucrative oil export facility at Kharg Island Terminal. In May 1984, Iraq conducted an air attack on the Kharg facilities, which resulted in reducing Iran's oil export capability by seventy-five percent. (18) This attack precipitated an increase in Iraqi attacks on Kharg and other loading terminals and oil tankers exporting Iranian oil. Iran responded with attacks on shipping

owned by and bound for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait transporting resources for Iraq or her allies. Iran also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. From 1984 until the end of 1986, what has been referred to as the Iran-Iraq "tanker war" resulted in 150 attacks on oil tankers. (19)

The increased frequency and intensity of attacks on Kuwaiti shipping resulted in a United States decision in May 1987 to re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers and escort them through the Persian Gulf, something the Soviet Union had already begun doing. Citing the criticality of oil exports to the economic prosperity of Europe, the United States requested its NATO Allies join in a "coordinated military presence" in the area. (20) In response, Lord Carrington, the NATO Secretary General, stated that the American request should be taken up outside NATO and several of the Allies suggested the United Nations was the correct forum. In August of the same year, the United States again requested assistance from NATO, in the form of mine sweepers, and was refused. (21)

The lack of willingness on the part of its NATO Allies to provide assistance was particularly disturbing to the United States because of America's insufficient capability in minesweeping operations; an operational deficiency which could have proved fatal to United States naval forces operating in the Gulf. America had not developed extensive capabilities in this area because, within NATO, minesweeping, or mine countermeasures (MCM), is a function provided by European navies in the Channel Command. (22) Several European countries

eventually reversed their position and sent MCM forces to the Persian Gulf, but not as NATO forces and not as a "coordinated military presence" as requested by the United States.

In reversing its initial decision not to send MCM forces to the Persian Gulf, Great Britain began to work within the Western European Union (WEU) to persuade other European nations to send naval forces to the region. (23) Ultimately Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, France, and Italy had dispatched ships to the Gulf. Holland and Belgium sent a joint task force, with a clearly stipulated European mission, under the auspices of the WEU. Great Britain sent eleven ships to accompany British-flagged merchant ships, clear mines between the Strait of Hormuz and Bahrain, and provide protection for four Dutch and Belgian MCM vessels. France had fifteen ships in the area to accompany French merchant ships and clear mines south of the Strait of Hormuz. Italy's presence in the area totaled eight ships to accompany Italian vessels and clear mines in the Gulf as far north as Kuwait. The two remaining WEU member nations, Germany and Luxembourg, did not send forces but displayed solidarity with the other WEU nations. Germany dispatched four warships to the Mediterranean, to replace allied ships sent to the Gulf; and Luxembourg made a symbolic monetary contribution to the WEU effort. (24) There was coordination among WEU members at three levels: discussions between Foreign and Defense Ministers, meetings between the naval staffs in the capitols, and regular consultation between naval commanders in the Gulf region. (25)

The endurance of the WEU nations was never tested, because none of the member nations' vessels in the Gulf were ever attacked, but the operation was successful in destroying close to half the estimated number of mines laid by Iran. (26) Although coordination for the participation occurred within the framework of the WEU, the member nations were quick to deny any indication of a collective effort. Great Britain stated there was "... no coordination of an organized kind..." and a French official stated "there is no agreement. The French Navy is acting for national interests". (27) The WEU provided a capability for European nations to address an out-of-area issue, accomplishing what could not be accomplished within the consultative framework of NATO: a high level forum for discussing resolutions to out-of-area issues, agreement among allies to participate in an out-of-area venture, and the coordination of a political strategy. (28)

The discussion, thus far, of out-of-area issues has dealt with the preimminence of the Warsaw Pact threat, followed by a rising importance of the economic threat to the Alliance in the atmosphere of reduced East-West tensions. The following chapter will examine NATO's approach to an out-of-area threat to European economic prosperity and world peace, the Gulf Crisis, caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. This marks a departure from all previous out-of-area issues for NATO. For the first time in the Alliance's forty year history, the Warsaw Pact is not a realistic imminent threat to the security of NATO member nations. The following analysis will

examine the impact of the virtual disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat on NATO's willingness and ability to demonstrate solidarity in addressing an out-of-area issue.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE GULF CRISIS

The decade of the 1990's began with an almost euphoric optimism for peace and prosperity in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a credible military threat, and easing of East-West tensions. The likelihood of war in Europe seemed remote and legislators of NATO member nations were talking about a "peace dividend": the diversion of programmed defense expenditures to other national requirements. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued at the close of the 5-6 July 1990 NAC meeting in London, introduced the concept of NATO reaching out to "... adversaries in the Cold War, and extend(ing) to them the hand of friendship". (1) Media commentators and political pundits began questioning the continued need for NATO; its mission of deterring Soviet aggression having been successful. On 2 August 1990, while the attention of the world was focused on a dynamically changing Europe, Iraq, with a force five times the size of the entire Kuwaiti military, invaded Kuwait and brought to global leaders a realization of the threats to peace and prosperity in a post-Cold War world.

The Iraqi invasion represents a threat to world stability for several reasons. First, it was a brutal act of aggression against a militarily insignificant and non-threatening neighbor. By all accounts, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein set out to obliterate the country of Kuwait. Kuwaiti citizens were

subjected to atrocities, citizenship records were destroyed, and banks and museums were looted. An unprovoked attack of this nature against any country is, essentially, an attack against every country in the world. If there is to be world stability following the Cold War, nations must have reason to feel relatively safe from this type of aggression.

The second reason the Iraqi invasion has global implications is the abundant oil reserves, not only in Kuwait, but also Saudi Arabia, which may have been Iraq's next victim had Saudi Arabia not requested, and received, outside assistance. Forty percent of the world's known oil reserves are in the Gulf region. In 1989, the Gulf oil producing states provided twenty-two and one-half percent of the industrial world's needs - specifically, eleven percent of America's and twenty eight percent of Western Europe's. (2) If Saddam's aggression had not been answered by the United States deployment to defend Saudi Arabia, there is no reason to believe he would not have moved to invade Saudi Arabia. Short of an invasion, he could, through coersing and threatening Saudi Arabia and the other major oil producing states in the region, manipulate the international oil market; placing the prosperity of both developed and developing nations of the world in jeopardy.

In addition to the injustice suffered by Kuwait and the threat to accessable and affordable Middle East oil, the world is affected by the Iraqi invasion because whatever the world community's response is will establish the de facto rules of

international behavior in the post-Cold War era. (3) If Saddam Hussein is permitted to be successful in the end, as a result of his military aggression, there will be little to deter other regional bullies in any area of the world from victimizing weaker neighbors.

Finally, Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and modern missile delivery systems which make a preemptive strike a constant threat and great tool of blackmail for a country whose leadership has displayed no hesitation in using force to attain its goals. In addition to possessing mustard gas, nerve gases, and biological warfare agents, Iraq is developing nuclear weapons. Although experts disagree on how soon Saddam will have a nuclear capability, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, which accurately predicted Saddam's plan to invade Kuwait, and Paul Beaver, editor in chief of Jane's Defence Weekly, predict Iraq will have a functioning atomic weapons system within two to three years. (4)

The Gulf Crisis created by the Iraqi invasion presents a classic out-of-area problem for NATO: a threat to global security and economic stability; a threat to the economic prosperity of a resurging Europe; potential threat of aggression against a NATO member, Turkey; and the moral issue of naked aggression against a virtually defenseless neighbor. Following a 10 August 1990 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, Secretary General Manfred Worner stated, "Iraqi aggression threatens international security and the collective security of the Allies. The NATO Alliance is vitally concerned" (5).

Although the Secretary General acknowledged the threat posed to NATO by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the response of Alliance members to the Gulf Crisis was weak and disjointed and received considerable attention and a degree of criticism. William H. Taft 4th, the United States Ambassador to NATO, while stating "the European performance (in response to the Gulf Crisis) has been better than a number of people in the United States are aware", it has "... not been as good as it could be". (6) Less diplomatically, an anonymous Senate aide was quoted as saying that "when the defense appropriations bill comes to the (Senate) floor, the NATO alliance will come up sucking sand". (7) Finally, NATO Secretary General Worner, in giving his "personal opinion", stated that "... NATO could and should do more to support the U.S.-led multinational force in Saudi Arabia". (8) Worner went on to say that when "... vital Western interests" are at stake "can we afford to be limited to consultations?". (9)

The following analysis of NATO member nations' responses to the Iraqi invasion will provide insights into their abilities and willingness to respond to out-of-area issues in the post-Cold War environment. The analysis will review both the response of NATO as a political entity, and the responses of Alliance members acting individually. The actions of individual nations are important because they reveal the ability, or inability, of NATO members to agree upon an appropriate course of action, without regard to interpretations of limitations imposed by the NATO Treaty. Because the

timeliness of nations' reactions to world crises is key to their effectiveness, the analysis will first look at NATO's response to the Gulf Crisis within the first three weeks of the invasion, followed by the member nations' responses over the ensuing months.

On 3 August, the United Nations Security Council voted to denounce the Iraqi invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On 4 August, the twelve-member European Community, eleven of which are NATO members, imposed an oil embargo on Iraq, stopped all arms sales to the country, and froze all Iraqi assets in Europe. On 6 August, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose economic sanctions on Iraq and, on 25 August, permitted United Nations member states to use limited naval force in the Gulf to ensure compliance with the those sanctions. (10) On 29 November, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force to push Iraqi military units out of Kuwait if they did not withdraw by 15 January 1991. (11) Two and one-half weeks later, on 17 December, NATO issued a statement committing itself for the first time to supporting the United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. (12)

The first nation to respond to the Gulf Crisis was the United States which, on 7 August, dispatched ground forces and fighter and bomber aircraft from the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), at the request of Saudi Arabia, to defend against a possible attack from eighteen Iraqi divisions moving south from Kuwait to the Kuwait- Saudi Arabia border. The

United States also began working immediately within NATO, the Arab nations, and the United Nations to establish a multinational military response to the Iraqi invasion. Great Britain was the only NATO member to produce a significant response to a United States' request for military assistance in the Gulf. Great Britain joined the United States' effort immediately and deployed twenty-four combat aircraft, three Nimrod maritime patrol planes, a squadron of air defense Rapier missile systems, three Navy minehunters, and one thousand service personnel to the region. (13) On 21 August, France deployed seven warships, two maritime patrol aircraft, and the aircraft carrier Clemenceau loaded with helicopters and anti-tank missiles. In addition, France deployed one hundred and eighty paratroopers to the United Arab Emirates. Other NATO nations providing naval support, but no ground forces, at this point included Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, which deployed minesweepers to the Mediterranean to replace NATO forces deployed to the Gulf.

These initial military actions taken by NATO members were national responses to United States' requests and in support of the United Nations sanctions and were not taken under the auspices of NATO. At NATO, a special meeting of the NAC was convened on 10 August to consult on the Gulf Crisis. The meeting marked the first instance in the history of the Alliance that the NAC met specifically to consult on a crisis outside NATO's area of operations. (14) At the close of the meeting, Secretary Worner stated that the " ... (the Ministers)

agreed that the members of this Alliance will contribute, each in its own way, to stopping further Iraqi military aggression". (15) While the NATO verbal support was encouraging, the United States was looking for a more substantive show of support. America had been urging that NATO take on the task of serving as the political force overseeing the Allied operations enforcing the United Nations embargo of Iraq. The United States saw this as a perfect opportunity for NATO to assist in the effort and prove its value for the 1990's. NATO was reluctant to take on the mission, stating that "... for the Alliance to respond collectively to the Iraqi threat would involve a significant expansion of NATO's charter, going far beyond its traditional job". (16) Although Turkey was potentially threatened by Iraq, NATO refused to send the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF): a small, specialized, multinational unit to the Iraqi - Turkish border to demonstrate NATO's resolve and send a definitive message to Iraq. (17) And so it was clear, within three weeks of the invasion, that the European members of NATO did not view the Gulf Crisis as a situation which warranted a collective NATO response. Mr. Steven F. Szabo, of John Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, said that the Gulf Crisis shows that "NATO is going to be increasingly irrelevant in the new world order - or disorder". (18)

All subsequent actions in response to the Iraqi invasion, with the exception of an effort by the Western European Union (WEU), were a cascade of uncoordinated, bilateral actions by

the individual European nations. (19) The WEU, in a meeting in Paris on 18 August, agreed to jointly send warships to the Gulf region and employ force if necessary to enforce the United Nations embargo against Iraq. Spain, which resisted efforts from its NATO Allies to assist with the naval embargo operation in the Gulf, joined the WEU effort and sent four warships to the Gulf. (20) Also under the WEU, Great Britain sent two frigates, a destroyer, four minesweepers, and three support ships; Italy sent two frigates, three minesweepers and two support ships; the Netherlands sent two minesweepers; Belgium sent two minesweepers; and France sent a destroyer, three frigates, three minesweepers and two support ships. (21) Portugal sent two ships and Greece, an observer at the meetings but not a WEU member, sent a frigate. (22)

NATO would continue to provide a forum for consultation over the following months but even that did not produce a significant response to United States' requests for assistance from the majority of the members of the Alliance. On 14 October, William H. Taft 4th, the United States ambassador to NATO, acknowledged that the United States deployment to the Gulf would not have been possible without the logistical base provided by the Alliance. (23) As individual nations, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Spain allowed the United States to use NATO bases within their territory in support of the American deployment to the Gulf. (24) However, Ambassador Taft indicated the assistance received from the European members of the Alliance could be better and that the "... proportion of

forces in the Gulf - 180,000 Americans and about 20,000 Europeans, counting those who are coming - does not adequately reflect Europe's stake". (25) Mr. Taft went on to say that polls "... show Europeans supporting the deployment of U.S., British, and French forces in the Gulf to protect, among other things, European interests - while opposing the use of their own troops there. The double standard is opportunistic at best". (26)

The exceptions have been Great Britain and Turkey, which have made significant contributions to the United States' effort. France also has contributed forces, but to a lesser degree. On 14 September, Great Britain announced it would send the 7th Armored Brigade, based in West Germany, to Saudi Arabia. The armored brigade consists of more than one hundred and twenty tanks and six thousand soldiers. (27) Turkey, which borders Iraq, shut down the two pipelines that carried 1.6 million barrels a day of Iraq's oil production across Turkish territory to the Mediterranean. Turkey has cut off one billion dollars in annual exports to Iraq and Kuwait as well as trucking contracts worth four hundred million a year. Finally, Turkey has reinforced deployments along its portion of the Iraqi border; forcing Iraq to keep nine divisions, almost ten percent of its army, along its northern flank and away from the southern border with Kuwait. (28) Although France possesses a rapid deployment capability with its forty-seven-thousand-strong Rapid Action Force (FAR), its response to United States' requests for military forces in the Gulf has been modest at

best. On 15 September, France announced plans to deploy 4,000 soldiers and heavy weapons to the Gulf region. This was, however, in reaction to Iraq raiding the French diplomatic compound in Kuwait the previous day, and not in response to the United States' requests. (29) France's President Mitterand has consistently distanced his country's policies from those of the United States in the Gulf Crisis. As an example, on 24 September, President Mitterand made a suggestion before an international audience at the United Nations that if Iraq were to signal its intention to withdraw from Kuwait, "everything would be possible". (30) This position was a significant departure from the United States' position that there would be no negotiations until Iraq had fully complied with the United Nations resolutions and completely withdrawn all forces from Kuwait. Aside from this demonstration of a lack of solidarity on the part of the Allies, even those actions taken in support of the United States' efforts were done on a national basis and not part of a NATO effort.

The most glaring example of a lack of substantive support from a NATO Ally is the case of Germany, which initially pledged minimal financial and equipment contributions and no forces, with the exception of the naval vessels sent to the constitution prohibits German military involvement. Articles 2 and 24 of the German Constitution, respectively, state that Germany can maintain forces only for defense and that Germany can participate in collective security organizations, such as

NATO. This has been interpreted by the German government as a prohibition against sending forces outside its borders. (31) This interpretation is made despite the fact that, by being a member of the United Nations, Germany is not only permitted, but obliged, under article 43 of the United Nations charter "to make available to the Security Council ...armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". (32) However, on 6 January 1991, Germany deployed one squadron of eighteen Alpha jet fighters and approximately two hundred and seventy pilots and support personnel to Turkey in response to a request Turkey made to NATO to help defend against a possible Iraqi attack. The German squadron joined fighter squadrons from Italy and Belgium to form a forty-two - aircraft unit. (33) This marked the first time since World War II that Germany had sent military forces outside its borders in response to a threat of war. (34) With regard to financial aid support, Germany has dedicated the equivalent of eight billion dollars to buy the Soviets out of what was East Germany, but has pledged a total of only two billion to the entire Gulf effort. Half of the two billion dollar aid package was for the United States and the other half to be divided among Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. It was later determined that a large amount of the aid for the United States was of questionable value; coming from East German storehouses as fall-out from German unification. (35) Germany's response to America's request for assistance has caused at least one

American lawmaker to conclude that Germany is an ally of the United States when it needs United States forces and aid in Europe, but that Germany is not an ally when the United States needs assistance. (36) German Chancellor Helmut Kohl conceded that it could be said of Germany that if "... there is money to be made, they're there, but if the issue is taking responsibility, they evade it". (37)

By November 1990, a total of fifty-four nations, a third of the members of the United Nations, were contributing militarily or economically to the multi-national Gulf effort against Iraq. (38) Of the approximately 550,000 ground forces in the Gulf region in January 1991, the major contributors are; the United States (430,000), Egypt (35,500), Great Britain (25,000), Syria (20,000), Saudi Arabia (20,000), and France (12,000). (39) While the world community, through the United Nations, responded to the crisis in the Gulf in an unprecedented manner, NATO was not a factor on the world scene. It is difficult to envision an out-of-area scenario that would provide a more significant threat to the security of NATO and greater violation of the principles for which NATO stands than that which is presented by the Gulf Crisis. NATO, however, refused to become involved militarily in the crisis as a political entity; while its member nations displayed their inability to act collectively and decisively in responding to the crisis. The United Nations resolutions, condemning the Iraqi invasion and authorizing the use of force to liberate Kuwait, opened the door for NATO involvement in the Gulf. The

Soviet Union, which supported the United Nations resolutions, was not an impediment; either in the form of a threat of escalation to an East-West confrontation in the Gulf, or as a threat of opportunistic aggression in Europe if NATO were involved in the Gulf.

NATO, however, did not act. As the world responded to the Gulf Crisis, NATO consulted in Brussels and issued statements of concern. The ideal opportunity to establish a precedent for out-of-area involvement and to contribute to world order and peace presented itself to NATO on 2 August 1990. NATO citing its charter, remained inert and, thus, irrelevant, in this, the first post-Cold War crisis.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the question of if and how NATO will alter its approach to the out-of-area question in light of the dramatic changes in Europe. The historical prospective covered in the preceding chapters provides insight into the motivations within the Alliance in addressing events outside its geographical boundaries. NATO was formed in 1949 solely to deter the threat of Soviet aggression against the territorial boundaries of NATO's member nations. Since its creation, the Alliance, citing NATO's reason for existence, has refused to be drawn into confrontations outside its borders. At the end of the decade of the 1980's, the Warsaw Pact was no longer a credible military threat, the Berlin Wall was dismantled, and the promise of increased East-West understanding brought hope of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. The London Declaration proposed the member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to a joint declaration stating that they are no longer adversaries. (1) Absent a Warsaw Pact military threat, will NATO now look to responding outside its borders to events which threaten its security?

In order for a political organization to respond to an actual or perceived threat, certain criteria must be met. First, there must be reasonable consensus among the organization members of the nature and severity of the threat. Secondly, the charter of the organization must provide the

authority for the members to respond to the threat collectively, in the name of the organization. Third, the organization must have the infrastructure that provides the capability to respond, either politically or militarily, or both, should the organization decide to take action. Finally, the organization must possess the political will to act decisively in a manner timely enough to demonstrate solidarity and produce the desired results. Using these criteria, some conclusions can be drawn about NATO's previous and future treatment of out-of-area issues.

In searching for threats to the security of NATO on which its members can reach a consensus, one does not have to look far. The Warsaw Pact fading into irrelevance as a military threat does not leave NATO without a mission in Europe. Security risks for NATO still exist on the European continent in the post-Cold War period. The Soviet Union remains a formidable military power with destabilizing internal problems. Secondly, the instability in Eastern Europe caused by political turmoil, economic strife, and ethnic rivalries presents security concerns for NATO. The Soviet Union's ability to evolve into a more democratic and non-threatening European neighbor is questionable following its decision in January 1991 to send paratroopers into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to round up draft evaders, close down independent publications, and prepare an economic blockade. (2) These are valid security concerns, but not of the magnitude of the threat of military attack by the Warsaw Pact. The changes in Europe provide NATO

the latitude to reconsider its historical refusal to address out-of-area issues. NATO's formal recognition, at the 1989 NATO Summit, of the importance of global issues outside the scenario of the traditional East-West confrontation demonstrates how NATO has changed since the early 1950's when members refused to discuss French involvement in Indochina. (3) The criticality of regional instabilities and their economic impact on NATO security was brought home by the Iran-Iraq War and the current Gulf Crisis. Neither event involved Soviet influence and neither was a direct military threat against the Alliance; yet both seriously jeopardized European economic security by threatening western nations' free access to oil.

While the Alliance has demonstrated the capability to agree on the severity of the threat posed by some out-of-area issues, there is no unanimity among the members regarding authority to act out-of-area under the NATO Treaty. The geographical clause of the treaty contained in Article VI does not preclude military action outside the boundaries of the Alliance. Although, over the years, it has been the basis for interpretations of political convenience by member nations wanting to avoid involvement in a particular issue, careful reading of the treaty brings the conclusion that there is no "area" to which the security interests of the Alliance are limited. Article VI merely limits the European area which, if attacked, each member nation is obligated, under Article V, to take "...action as it deems necessary" to restore and maintain security. (4) Despite arguments to the contrary, a NATO

response out-of-area does not require a change of the treaty; merely a legitimate, rather than political, interpretation.

With regard to having a capability to respond, NATO certainly has the structure to deal effectively with out-of-area issues. In fact, NATO's integrated military command structure makes it unique among international alliances in its ability to execute military plans; particularly in its proven capabilities in command and control, which have routinely been practiced in NATO exercises in Europe. Timely accessibility to member nations for consultation in the event of a crisis is not a problem. The North Atlantic Council, representing the highest level of decision-making machinery in NATO, is in permanent session and can be convened at any time, day or night, on about two hours' notice. (5) NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), created in 1960, has the stated mission to deploy on short notice to any threatened part of Allied Command Europe to demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance and its ability and determination to defend itself against aggression. (6) This current multi-national NATO rapid response capability is ideally suited for demonstrating resolve in regions outside NATO, if the Alliance were to decide to take such steps. In addition to the AMF, the future NATO forces will be more mobile and versatile than they are today as NATO transitions "...from forward defense to forward presence". (7) The smaller, mobile force will enhance NATO's capability for quick response to out-of-area problems.

The above assessment provides the following conclusions

regarding NATO's ability to respond out-of-area: NATO has the structure for timely decision-making; member nations have formally acknowledged that events occurring outside NATO boundaries, other than military aggression against the Alliance, can threaten its security; NATO is not restricted geographically by its treaty; and NATO has the capability to respond militarily. The decisive factors for NATO in addressing out-of-area issues are; the ability to reach consensus on appropriate actions to be taken, and the political will to act.

The difficulty member nations have in agreeing upon appropriate actions has existed within NATO since the creation of the Alliance. The lack of consensus has resulted in disputes within the Alliance, as was the case with the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the Gulf Crisis, the United States and France agreed on the need to support the United Nations resolution requiring Saddam Hussein to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait or be removed forcefully, but did not present a unified and consistent position on negotiations with Iraq. Characteristically, the United States, with its ability to project military power, is quicker to consider military force in resolving regional problems than are its European allies; with the exception of Great Britain and France. The Europeans, who, except for France and Great Britain, lack the capability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces outside Europe, place much more emphasis on negotiations, rather than the threat of force, in working to solve regional disputes.

Divergent national views and interests will never be subjugated to the goals of the Alliance. Accordingly, NATO is incapable of attaining the collective political will to act as an entity. Using the Gulf Crisis as an example, Great Britain was in agreement with, and immediately joined, the United States military response to the Iraqi invasion. The rest of NATO, notably Germany, France, and Italy, hesitated and, had it not been for pressure from the United States and, in France's case, Iraq seizing French diplomats, may have never acted. The members of the Alliance followed courses dictated by what they interpreted as being in their best interests.

Germany was preoccupied with unification and upcoming elections and has interpreted its constitution as forbidding military action outside its borders. Germany's financial pledge of assistance to the Gulf effort was minimal and slow in materializing. France, long resentful of United States' dominant influence in NATO, and not wanting to appear to be closely allied with the United States militarily, deployed sizeable ground forces only in response to Iraq's invasion of the French diplomatic compound in Kuwait. France has moved carefully throughout the Gulf Crisis in an attempt to minimize any damage to its relations with the Arab nations. Italy declined to participate militarily in the initial stages; and, by January, 1991, did not deploy any ground forces. The Italian air force elements which were deployed were to provide defensive cover for Allied ships in the Gulf. Their participation in long range bombing of Iraqi forces was the

result of a last minute decision by the Italian government following a heated debate in the Italian legislature. (8) The remaining NATO members provided little timely support to the Gulf effort and most seemed, to coin an old phrase, "willing to fight to the last American". The pitifully small contributions made by the European members of NATO were provided under the United Nations umbrella, with coordination being accomplished by the nine-member WEU. NATO was never a factor.

In order for this to change and for NATO to effectively address out-of-area problems in the future, the Alliance must agree to a charter for such actions to preclude never-ending consultations in a time-compressed scenario. Since NATO is, by definition, a defensive Alliance, the first step in developing an out-of-area charter is to identify the agreed-upon threats and what is acceptable to the members as defensive action. If this were accomplished, than appropriate adjustments could be made in planning for force structure, command and control, logistics, and other standard planning considerations. In order for a plan of this nature to be successful, the members of the Alliance would first have to share common views of global problems and solutions to those problems. Secondly, the Alliance would have to agree to a few basic operational necessities in the early stages of a crisis; such as imposition of economic sanctions, or rapid deployment of a tripwire force to demonstrate resolve. This would have to be done without regard to who has lucrative arms deals with whom, past colonial relationships, or other national concerns.

A review of past performances by Alliance members does not provide any reason to conclude that there will be a change in their propensity to avoid commitment out-of-area. This tendency for a lack of consensus among sixteen sovereign nations in addressing any threat except direct attack critically limits any potential for NATO to effectively address out-of-area issues. The elimination of the Warsaw Pact as a military threat and NATO's non-response to the Gulf Crisis has removed the last remnants of the facade about the Alliance's political will to act out-of-area.

The NATO Treaty was characterized by General Beaufre as expressing broad and vague principles, leaving more specific policies to be formed by NATO's application of those principles. NATO has, through more than forty years of experience, established a policy of "concerned non-involvement" in out-of-area issues. Despite the diminished military threat in Europe, and despite actions by the United Nations, NATO has not, and will not in the future, act as an effective political alliance in addressing out-of-area issues. History demonstrates that it is not viewed by NATO members as being in their best national interests to forfeit to NATO their autonomy, flexibility, and options in addressing issues beyond defense of the territorial boundaries of the Alliance. Their position will not be altered by any threat or set of circumstances. Member nations will continue to consult, exchange information, and explain national positions within the NATO framework; but nothing more, for as long as NATO is in existence. NATO's

relevancy will continue to be in relation to the threat posed by instability in Europe and the threat of an attack against NATO territory; not its response to out-of-area issues, an area in which NATO has established its reticence and impotence.

ENDNOTES

1. London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in a meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance in London on 5-6 July 1990, p. 3.

2. T. Kelam and M. Rikken, "Baltics: Uncle Sam Should Stick to His Principles, International Herald Tribune, 9 January 1991.

3. NATO Information Service, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures, p. 449.

4. Ibid., p. 377.

5. Ibid., pp. 322-324.

6. Ibid., p. 351.

7. "New NATO strategy to employ tripwire force along old border", Stars & Stripes, 13 October 1990.

8. "Sortie Success Over Kuwait Lifts Italian Morale", International Herald Tribune, 23 January 1991.

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